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Preface 
T h e  research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the  broader economic devel- 
opments tha t  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the  processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the  capabilities 
t o  generate, imitate  and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and  the  aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the  interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. T h e  central purpose is t o  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is tha t  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid t o  the known empirical details of the phenomena the  work aims t o  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the  'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it  stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it  was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the  empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the  similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables tha t  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition t o  empirical work a t  the  technology or sector level, the  last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the  facts tha t  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the  
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions t ha t  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought t o  address now are much more clearly defined. The  theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts t ha t  needed t o  be explained. 
The  list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the  persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way t o  the  evidence regarding the  time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the  theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. T h e  philosophy of this project 
is tha t  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an  environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the  theorists and their work. 
In particular,  the project is meant t o  pursue an 'evolutionary7 interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt ;  second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection7 by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits;  and,  third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, t he  project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
T h e  research focuses upon the  following three major areas: 
1. Lcarning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Tcchnological and Industrial Dynamics 
3.  Innovation, Corrlpetition and Macrodynamics 
I Introduction 
This is a preliminary report on a comparative study of how 
several major "high techtt industries evolved in the United States, 
Japan, and in Western Europe. At the most general level, the 
inquiry is about the ways in which the development of these 
industries was similar, and different, in the different countries, 
and the factors explaining the differences. I and my colleagues 
are especially interested in understanding the factors behind 
instances where firms in a particular country gained a significant 
competitive advantage over firms based in other countries. 
The study presently includes seven industries: organic 
chemical products, computers, software, semiconductors, numerical 
controlled machine tools, pharmaceuticals in the age of 
biotechnology, and medical devices'. The birth of several of these 
industries was associated with the opening up of a major new 
technology. In each technological advance has been rapid, and 
I The authors of the industry chapters are: 
Chemical products: Asish Arora and Nathan Rosenberg 
Computers: Timothy Bresnahan and Franco Malerba 
Semiconductors: Richard Langlois and Edward Steinmueller 
Software: David Mowery 
Numerical controlled machine tools: Roberto Mazzoleni 
Pharmaceuticals in the age of biotechnology: Rebecca 
Henderson, Luigi Orsenigo, and Gary Pisano 
Medical devices: Annetine Gelijns and Nathan Rosenberg 
In addition, a number of other scholars are participating 
in the project as general discussants and contributors. 
competition has involved innovation in a central way. The industry 
studies presently are far from completed, and thus I can not report 
on them in any detail. However, I can lay out some of the general 
analytic perspectives that have guided the studies, and provide 
some illustrations drawing from the industry cases. 
Obviously one basic premise is that industries can be regarded 
as evolving in some meaningful sense. But just what does one mean 
when one says that something evolves? (For a general discussion of 
this issue see Nelson, 1995). Our interpretation in this study is 
that industry development involves both random elements that 
generate and perhaps sustain variety, and systematic shaping 
forces. But then the issue arises as to what the systematic forces 
are and, relatedly, what aspects of an industry evolve 
systematically. 
The study also obviously is committed to the presumption that 
an industry can and does evolve in different ways in different 
settings, in particular in different countries. But if, in fact, 
one does observe strong differences, what lies behind them? Are 
there factors that systematically vary across countries that shape 
these differences? If so, what are they, and are they the same or 
different for different industries? Alternatively, might the 
differences be due to differences in the firm and industry 
structures that just happened to arise in particular countries, 
with country differences at a higher level having no particular 
shaping influence? But if this is the explanation, what explains 
why a characteristic whose source was to some extent random proved 
durable? 
I explore some of these questions in Section I1 and 111, and 
give an indication regarding what the industry studies suggest 
regarding them. Then, in Section IV, I speculate on some of the 
more general patterns that appear to be emerging in the industry 
studies. 
I1 Industrv Evolution 
To say that an industry evolves can carry a number of 
connotations. At the most basic level, it suggests a dynamic 
process in which both random and systematic elements matter, with 
the latter in effect "selectingH on the former. However evolution 
sometimes also carries the connotation of development, of 
systematic changes occurring as an entity, in this case an 
industry, gets older. Some theories about path dependent 
evolutionary processes propose that, while which particular variant 
initially is selected involves an element of chance, that initial 
defining event can influence strongly the whole future path of 
evolution. There is development, but the particular path of 
development is shaped by random as well as systematic forces. 
If one entertains the developmental connotation, one can ask 
what aspects of an industry change systematically? And what 
systematic development patterns do they go through? In our study 
we are focussing on three different but strongly interdependent 
aspects: technology, firm and industry structure, and supporting 
and constraining laws, policies, and institutions. In an earlier 
article in ICC (Nelson,1994) I discussed some of the recent 
research by economists and other social scientists on these aspects 
of industry evolution. Below I concentrate on what our seven 
industry study seems to suggest about them. 
The Evolution of Technolow 
Twenty years ago, Abernathy and Utterback (1978) put forth a 
theory of the natural evolution of a broad technology that has 
attracted many adherents. Under that theory, when young a 
technology is tried out by different parties in a variety of 
different versions. Each is relatively clumsy. There is no 
consensus among technical people, entrepreneurs, or potential users 
regarding what version is or will be the most successful. 
Relatedly, the market for the products embodying the technology is 
at once small, and fragmented. 
According to this broad theory, with time and effort one or 
more of the variants gets improved enough to attract a more 
sizeable market. A number of authors have argued that a single 
broad dominant product design tends to emerge, with some product 
differentiation but a great diminution of the variety that existed 
earlier (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978, Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). Product improving technical advance then becomes much more 
focussed, and incremental. Under some versions of the theory 
efforts at improving technology tend to shift towards process R & 
D. 
There are several different theories about the emergence of a 
dominant design. Under one, the best variant simply comes to be 
found. Under another, a chance concentration of R & D efforts on 
a particular broad design results in improvements that make it 
dominant, and raise the hurdles for other designs to sufficient 
heights that efforts at advancing them simply are abandoned. In 
the parlance of modern economics, this is a "dynamic increasing 
returns" story. 
Other dynamic increasing returns stories stress systems 
aspects. The focus is on interaction economies that may occur when 
the number who own and use a particular variant grows, or as skills 
develop that are particular to a certain variant, or investments 
are made in complementary products designed to fit with a 
particular variant. (See, e.g., David, 1985, 1991, Arthur, 1989, 
and Katz and Shapiro, 1994). While sometimes used more generally, 
the special term "standardM tends to be used to denote the key 
mechanism or configuration that defines and delineates the dominant 
llsystemll when it emerges. As the authors writing in this field 
argue convincingly, which particular standard emerges and, in 
effect, "locksn in the system, may be a matter partly of chance. 
When Abernathy and Utterback first spun out the dominant 
design story, they based it on detailed observation of only one 
industry - automobile manufacturing. Since that time the basic 
story line has been tried, and found fitting, in a wide range of 
industries. (See in particular the work of Tushman and colleagues, 
1985, 1986, and by Utterback and Suarez, 1993). Some writers 
clearly believe it is universal. I confess some skepticism about 
that. The story seems to fit best industries where the product is 
a "systemv, and where customers have similar demands. 
In the industries in our study, there is evidence of the 
emergence of a broad market encompassing dominant design in 
computers, semiconductors, and, with modifications discussed below, 
numerical controlled machine tools. However, even in these cases, 
the life span of a particular dominant design has been limited. 
The markets for organic chemical products, pharmaceuticals, and 
medical devices, are extremely variegated and no single design 
meets all needs. There is no evidence of broad dominant designs in 
these fields . Software needs to be tailored to particular 
applications, although there certainly is a systems compatibility 
constraint that binds different programs together. 
The case of numerically controlled machine tools illustrates 
some of the difficulties and complexities of the dominant design 
concept. Numerical control originally was conceived as a way to 
bring precision to complex machining operations. The first 
generation of numerical controlled tools were designed with that 
end in mind, and was extensively used in producing aircraft. 
However another use of numerical control turned out to be in 
flexible manufacturer. The market became divided between tools 
specialized to these two very different kinds of demand. 
Also, while technology life cycle theories tend to posit thai 
each industry goes through one cycle - from infancy to maturity as 
it were - in most of the industries in our study there are episodes 
where, after the technology appeared to have settled into a groove, 
there was a revolution. This is particularly striking in 
computers, whose underlying technologies changed radically with the 
advent of the integrated circuit, and again with microprocessors. 
The basic circuitry of numerical controlled machine tools for 
flexible manufacture has shifted from closed loop to open loop and 
back again. The technology of many medical devices has been 
revolutionized by advances in microelectronics, and fiberoptics. 
Biotechnology is revolutionizing the technology of pharmaceutical 
R and D. 
Put another way, to the extent that there are periods when a 
technology appears to be moving towards some kind of an equilibrium 
or along an equilibrium trajectory, that equilibrium is not 
forever. Perhaps the appropriate concept is that of punctuated 
equilibrium. And, in our industries at least, the periods of 
punctuation - when the technology is changing from one pattern to 
another - often are marked by shifts in the locus of industry 
leadership. 
The Evolution of Firm and Industry Structure 
Which brings me to the second aspect of industry evolution we 
are studying - changes in firm and industry structure over time. 
Here, as with technology, there is a body of theorizing which 
posits a standard pattern of evolution. Or, rather, we have two 
bodies of theory, one in economics, and the other in organization 
theory. 
The line of theorizing in economics basically begins with 
Mueller and Tilton (1969) . After more than a decade of little 
follow on, in the 1980s Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and 
Grady (1990) developed the empirical and theoretical argument 
further. Utterback (1994) has added significantly to the 
presentation. The basic propositions are these. During the early 
period of experimentation and flux, before a dominant design 
emerges, there are no particular advantages to incumbency. Market 
demand is fragmented across a number of variants. Firms producing 
particular designs tend to be small. Model change is frequent. 
There is a considerable amount of exit from and entry into the 
industry. 
However, after a dominant design becomes established, f irms 
that do not produce a variant of it tend to drop out of the 
industry, or into small niche markets. With product design more 
stabilized, learning by incumbent firms becomes more cumulative, 
and potential entrants increasingly are at a disadvantage. With 
the market less fragmented and more predictable, firms try to 
exploit latent economies of scale, and advances in process 
technology both reflect and enforce this. Generally scale 
intensive technology is capital intensive as well, and so the cost 
of entry rises for this reason too. There is "shake out" in the 
industry and structure becomes more concentrated, with the 
surviving firms tending to be relatively large. 
Organizational theorists will recognize, of course, that a 
theory with the same domain, and with many of same conclusions, has 
grown up among scholars studying the evolution of populations of 
organizations. Here, however, the connections with hypothesized 
patterns of technological evolution tend to be weaker, or at least 
less well articulated. And the key concepts are quite different 
(see Hannan and Freeman, 1990, and Carroll and Hannan, 1995). 
These include the disadvantages, in terms of access to external 
resources and support, of firms trying to work in new areas, the 
I11egitimationu of such activity with time and as the number of 
firms engaged in it grows, the gradual institutionalization of ways 
of doing things in a field, and the crowding of the field which 
ultimately slows entry. 
In my view, rather than being at odds, the economic and 
sociological theories about the evolution of firm and industry 
structure are quite complementary. Their story lines combine 
nicely rather than clashing. 
But while the story is coherent, as with the theory about 
dominant designs, one can question how universal is the proposed 
pattern of industry evolution. The empirical work by Gort and 
Klepper (1982) and Klepper (1993) show that the basic story does 
seem to fit a wide range of industries in the U.S. Utterback and 
Suarez (1993) and Utterback (1994) similarly claim widespread 
applicability. However, there certainly are exceptions. 
These exceptions include several of the industries in our 
study. Thus while a few software giants have grown up, the 
industry continues to include many small firms, and entry and exit 
continue at a rapid pace. Many small companies coexist with a few 
large ones in the medical devices industries, and new devices of ten 
continue to be introduced to the market by new small companies. As 
noted, in computers the advent of radically new component 
technologies has set in train bursts of new entry in an industry 
that prior to these developments had seemed to be stabilizing. 
Machine tools continue to be made by a large number of small firms, 
although a few large ones exist. Only in chemical products and 
semiconductors does the theory seem to fit tolerably well, but even 
here entry by companies in countries that previously had no 
presence in the industry continues to occur. 
Also, virtually all of the studies mentioned above have been 
focussed on the United States. One of the interesting questions 
being probed in the present study is whether there are significant 
differences across countries in the pattern of industry evolution. 
There definitely seems to be. For one thing, the evolution of 
industry structure in the United States appears to involve the 
entry of new firms when technology changes radically to a much 
greater extent than in Japan or Europe. There also are other 
interesting differences. More on this later. 
Theorizing about the evolution of firm and industry structure 
has not, in general, considered the question of the degree of 
vertical and horizontal integration of activities within firms, or 
the extent to which division of labor develops between firms. 
Probably George Stigler's argument (1971) on this, put forth many 
years ago, is the most familiar to economists. He proposed that 
the natural tendency was for an industry to move from an initial 
situation where firms did a wide variety of things "inside" 
because, in effect, there were no "outside suppliers", to one where 
there was more division of labor. On the other hand, it can be 
argued that, as a technology matures and sales of a product grow 
large, there may be gains to a firm from specially tailoring a 
product system, which may lead it to take more of the component 
design and production inside. 
Perhaps the best example of the Stigler story revealed in our 
case studies is the rise of specialized chemical process plant 
designers and builders that occurred during the 1930s, and has been 
specially important since World War 11. An important consequence 
has been the unifying of process technology among chemical product 
firms, regardless of their nationality. 
Langlois and Robertson (1995) develop a more complex theory 
than Stigler's. Their focus is on the trade off between the 
advantages of coordinating technical change that a single 
organization can achieve, and the advantages of being able to 
choose from a wide menu that is preserved if one does not try to 
integrate. The history of the computer industry reflects this more 
complex story. The major producers of main frame computers 
originally did inside a lot of their component design and 
production, including their software. In the U.S. IBM came to 
unbundle software during the 1970s, leading to the rise of an 
independent software industry in the U.S. Partly this was forced 
by antitrust pressure. But partly it occurred because specialized 
software designers turned out to be better than IBM at certain 
things. In any case, unbundling did not happen to anything like 
the same extent in Japan or Europe. 
The major computer companies originally tended to produce 
their own integrated circuits. But the development of strong 
innovative companies producing and selling integrated circuits, and 
later microprocessors, led in the United States - less so in Japan 
and Europe - to computer companies that bought these components 
from others, rather than producing them themselves. This is the 
hallmark of P.C. production where even IBM buys components from 
outside. Again, this development has been less sharp in Japan and 
Europe. 
The Evolution of Su~~ortins Institutions 
Firms do not stand by themselves, of course, but rather in a 
context in which they compete with rivals, sell to customers, are 
served by suppliers, and draw on particular talents and skills. 
For an industry with special input and skills needs, expansion in 
size and effectiveness is strongly conditioned by how rapidly and 
effectively a support structure providing these grows up. Some 
industries have special financing needs, and expansion requires 
that mechanisms arise to service these. While many of these 
ancillary developments proceed through market or market like 
mechanisms, a society's institutions - -  both general and specific 
to the broad sector that contains the developing industry - -  will 
of course influence the process. 
From one point of view, one can regard a nation's broad 
institutional structures as basically a given and constant, and 
consider how these helped or hindered the evolution of the 
industry's support structure. Where one is observing the same 
industry growing up in different countries, a central question of 
interest is whether broad national institutional differences made 
a real difference in how, and how effectively, the industry 
evolved. 
But from another point of view, particularly if one homes in 
on institutions specific to particular industries, the question is 
how various features of the institutional environment themselves 
adapted and changed in response to pushes and pulls exerted by the 
development of the new industry. Thus the development of an 
effective system of labor training, the establishment of product 
standards, and the emergence of customary patterns of interaction 
between firms, suppliers, and customers, and across firms in the 
industry, often require the creation of new informal and formal 
organizations. As these form people become conscious that there is 
a new industry, and that it has collective interests and needs 
(See, e.g. Granovetter, 1985). Industry or trade associations 
form. These give the industry a recognized organization that can 
lobby on its behalf for regulation to its liking, for protection 
from competition from outside the group, for public programs to 
support it, etc. This is another feature of an industry's 
evolution that can lock in the status quo. 
Quite often when a new technology comes into existence, there 
is little scientific understanding relevant to it. However in many 
cases the presence of the new technology then induces scientific 
research to understand it, and lay the basis for its subsequent 
development. The result may be the creation of a new scientific 
field related to that technology (See Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). 
Thus, to draw some examples from our comparative industry study, 
the field of chemical engineering came into existence in the United 
States to meet the demands of the new chemical products industry. 
Computer science was brought into existence by the advent of the 
modern computer. 
Recognition of the role of new academic disciplines ~ L I )  
supporting a new technology points attention to another aspect in 
which national differences may be significant. The ability of the 
new industry to grow up strong in a country may depend on the 
prevailing strength of university research and training in the 
relevant underlying fields. It also may depend on the speed and 
effectiveness with which the national universities build up 
strength in the new relevant fields. Our industry case studies 
show both kinds of national differences at work. 
There almost always are issues regarding the setting of 
standards. The nexus involving computer hardware design, an,5 
software, is a prominent example. There may be intellectual 
property rights issues that need to be sorted out - biotechnolsq-y 
is a striking contemporary case in point. There almost always at 
issues of regulation; again, biotechnology is an important case in 
point. In many cases new public sector activities and programs are 
involved. Numerically controlled machine tools were brought into 
existence by the U. S . Department of Defense to meet its needs. The 
military was the early major source of research funding for 
computers, and they provided most of the early market. The spread 
of computers in the U.S. greatly benefitted from the advent of 
internet, nudged into place by the Department of Defense. 
These examples indicate that the evolution of institutions 
relevant to a technology or industry may be a very complex process, 
involving not only the actions of private firms, but also 
organizations like industry associations, technical societies, 
universities, courts, government agencies, legislatures, etc. The 
"new institutional  economic^^^ started with a broad theoretical 
stance that, somehow, institutions changed optimally (if perhaps 
with a lag) in response to changes in economic circumstances that 
called for those changes. Recently however scholars are beginning 
to highlight the interest group conflict over government policies 
in a field, and the strong sensitivity of outcomes to political 
structures and processes. (See, e .g., North, 1990, Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1981, and Cohen and Noll, 1991). Not only is there an 
abandonment of the assumption of "optimality" of institutional 
response; there now is recognition that such developments are 
strongly path dependent, and that one needs a process model to 
predict and understand what the institutional accommodations will 
be. It is sure that the way the process works, and institutions 
evolve, differ from country to country. 
I11 Theories of the Sources of Comparative or Com~etitive 
Advan tase 
The foregoing discussion leads naturally into consideration of 
the reasons why an industry might evolve differently in different 
countries. One answer is that, where one observes significant 
differences, the reason resides in particular characteristics of 
the different countries. There is a long standing tradition in 
economies of seeing the sources of comparative advantage in country 
level variables. On the other hand, another strand of theorizing 
down plays the relevance of this line of causation, and stresses 
the importance of the firms that happened to take hold in different 
countries. From this point of view, countries are strong in 
certain industries because their firms are strong, rather than 
because of any broad national features. Still other theories place 
the emphasis on structures smaller than a country but larger than 
individual firms . 
National Level Variables 
From at least the time of Adam Smith, economists have tended 
to see the factors influencing industry performance as residing at 
the level of the nation. Earlier versions of the theory of 
comparative advantage (for example David Ricardo's) stressed 
differences across nations in climate, or the fertility of land, or 
natural resources. Later, the body of theorizing that got 
systematized in what came to be called Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
focused more generally on differences across nations in the 
relative supplies of basically immobile factors of production, and 
in the differences in factor prices that were the consequence of 
different factor endowments. In its simplest standard version, 
Heckscher-Ohlin repressed, or denied, differences in technological 
capabilities among firms in different countries. Rather, the focus 
was on the different choices that firms would make among general 
available technologies as a function of differences in market 
conditions across countries. 
Of the industries in our study, only Chemical Products is 
strongly dependent upon natural resource inputs. Here Germany, 
which took the lead towards the end of the 19th century, was 
abundantly endowed with coal which was the principal feed stock for 
the new dyestuffs and related new products, but several of her 
potential competitors also were well endowed with coal. The U.S. 
industry clearly was advantaged when, in the 1930s, the feed stock 
shifted to petroleum. However, with the advent of low cost oil 
shipping, that advantage dissolved. In none of our industries do 
large relative factor price differences seem a likely powerful 
reason for inter country differences. However in several 
industries particular differential skill availabilities did seem to 
matter. I will return to this issue shortly. 
The I1product cycle" and related theories of international 
trade break from the assumption that technological capabilities and 
abilities are the same across countries, but stay with the broad 
assumption that, whatever it is that gives an industry a particular 
advantage in the development and implementation of new technology, 
these factors reside at the national level (see Dosi, Pavitt, and 
Soete, 1990). Thus in some treatments the key factor is a 
relatively large supply of people with a high level of scientific 
and engineering education. That factor is complemented, in some 
theories, by the proposition that particular national markets are 
willing to pay high prices for new products, or to subsidize their 
creation. In the case of our industries, several scholars have 
proposed that the rise to dominance of the German chemical products 
industry at the end of the 19th century was due to Germany's large 
supply of chemists (see e.g. Beer, 1959) . The U.S. advantage in 
the creation of software probably was facilitated by the 
availability of people trained in programming, plus the large stock 
of computers, first main frame, and later personal computers, in 
the U.S. The early U.S. dominance in computers has been ascribed, 
at least partially, to the market for computers provided by the 
American military, which called into existence technologies which 
later proved commercially relevant. 
For the purposes of discussion here, I want to highlight a 
view on the sources of national comparative advantage that is at 
once new and very old, that focuses on national institutions. Thus 
the differences in the availability of trained people, mentioned 
above as an explanatory factor, itself needs to be explained. 
Landes (1980) and Beer (1959) have proposed that the basic reason 
why Germany, and not Great Britain, gained early comparative 
advantage in the then new chemical products industry, was the 
strength of German university research and training. The 
availability of trained chemists for German industry was a direct 
consequence of the strength of the German university system. 
Recent analyses of the reasons why the U.S. has such strength in 
software and biotechnology stress the research and training 
capabilities and responsiveness to industrial demands of the 
American university system. 
Other scholars have proposed that other kinds of national 
institutions make a big difference. In our study we have 
considered, among other factors, the effects of different national 
financial systems, and different broad policies regarding 
competition. The presence of a venture capital market in the U.S., 
and the apparent absence of its equivalent in Japan, Germany, and 
other industrial nations, almost certainly is part of the reason 
why the beginnings of a new industry in the U.S. often has been 
marked by the birth of small firms, to a far greater extent than in 
other countries. The differences between the U.S. and elsewhere 
(except possibly the U.K.) in biotechnology is striking. 
Similarly, the advent of new technologies opening up new 
possibilities for computers has spurred entry of new firms in the 
U , S . ,  much more than elsewhere. 
The effects of the unusually strong U. S. anti trust policy 
also show up clearly in several of the comparative industry 
studies. Thus during the interwar period, in Germany and the U.K., 
firms in the chemical products industry tended to merge, often 
encouraged by government policies. In the U.S. such mergers were 
basically ruled out by anti trust. As a result, the U.S. was 
marked by greater intra market diversity and competition among 
f irms. The unbundling of computer hardware and software in the 
U.S. was first forced by anti trust action against IBM. 
The scholars working on the project have discussed whether 
differences in corporate law, or intellectual property rights law, 
seem to have affected the development paths taken by the industries 
in different countries. While the questions are still quite open, 
my judgment call is "probably not much". 
On the other hand, differences in regulatory regimes may well 
have made a difference in biotech, and in medical devices. But the 
evidence here is not yet very solid. 
Capabilities Residins within Firms 
A striking feature of the theories of national comparative 
advantage discussed above, whether the focus be on resource 
endowments and prices, or institutions and laws, is that little 
room is left for discretionary behavior of firms, or differences in 
firm competencies. Given national factor availabilities and 
institutions, firms that are in a "right" industry succeed, while 
firms that are in the "wrong" industry do poorly or fail. 
The presumptions contained in the above theories stand in 
sharp contrast to those put forth by Business School scholars, to 
the effect that the principal determinant of whether a firm 
succeeds is its own strategy and structure, to use Chandler's 
(1990) terms, and the investments it makes in R and Dl production, 
marketing, and management. (For a fine review, see Teece, 1993.) 
In the simplest and starkest version of the theory, differences in 
national conditions, be they factor availabilities or institutions, 
disappear from view. Thus in the Womack et a1 study (1991) of why 
Japanese automobile firms were doing better than American ones, the 
emphasis was totally on firm level differences, and the authors 
argue explicitly that American firms, if they chose, could do just 
what the Japanese were doing and do it as well. 
There are more complex versions of this theory that do 
recognize factors outside of individual firms. Thus Chandler 
(1990) recognizes that a very large scale of the American market 
during the late 19th and early 20th century provided a different 
environment for American firms to develop in than that faced by 
British firms. Scholars like Aoki (1990) stress that broader 
Japanese institutions - in particular those associated with finance 
and employment - sustain and support the particular managerial and 
organizational characteristics of Japanese firms. However, all of 
these authors argue, explicitly and emphatically, that there is 
considerable room for discretionary behavior on the part of firm 
managers, and that what firms do within these discretionary bands 
is a major, perhaps the major, determinant of how they do 
competitively. 
In support of this theory it can be argued that, while the 
special American military demand for computers gave IBM the R anil 
D and production experience it later used successfully to enter and 
dominate the non-military market, IBM itself took very great risks 
and developed a strategy and organization that, for many years, 
proved unbeatable on civilian markets. While the German chemical 
products companies at the end of the 19th century certainly were 
advantaged by the availability of many well trained young chemists, 
these companies themselves took the risk and made the investment in 
establishing industrial research and development laboratories. In 
doing so, they were venturing onto new ground. 
As the above examples suggest, it may be hard to separate 
clearly the effects of national economic environmental factors, 
fromthe advantages firms gain through their own initiatives. When 
IBM involved itself in work on computers for the U.S. D.0.D. during 
the Korean war, its own judgements were that the commercial market 
for computers was very limited. But IBM clearly was far ahead of 
its competitors when, somewhat later, it developed a better sense 
of that market and how to serve it. In the 1920s firms in the'u.~. 
faced lower cost petroleum supplies than firms in Europe. But U.S. 
chemical companies, in alliance with researchers at places like 
MIT, took the risks and made the needed investments for moving from 
coal to petroleum based production. 
On the other hand, our industry histories are full of 
instances of firms who were very strong working with one basic 
technology or catering to one market, not having the capability to 
adjust when the technology or the market changed, or new 
opportunities opened up. In some of these cases the rigidity of 
the firms seems to have had a lot to do with the structure of their 
supporting institutions. Thus U.S. machine tool firms were not 
able to see clearly much less seize the big market for flexible 
manufacture, largely because they were focussed on the precision 
machining market of defense procurement. 
In any case, it probably is misguided to think of the lines of 
causation between f irm behavior and the economic environment in 
which firms reside as flowing strictly from the latter to the 
former. MIT was brought into existence in the late 19th century 
with the funding of Massachusetts businessmen who were dissatisfied 
with the training being offered at Harvard. 
Resions, Networks, and Sectoral S u ~ ~ o r t  Svstems 
Still other theories identify the source of competitive 
advantage in structures smaller than a national economy, but larger 
than the individual firm. Thus Michael Porter (1990) proposes that 
where one observes strong competitive advantage of firms of a 
particular nationality, one tends to find a number of such firms 
competing aggressively with each other. One also tends to find, 
according to this theory, strong input suppliers, and demanding 
customers. While Porter notes that such clusters often are 
associated with particular geographical regions, he does not stress 
this. On the other hand, Paul Krugman (1991), developing a theme 
introduced many years ago by Alfred Marshall, has focused 
explicitly on geographical ccncentrations. 
The industrial district of Marshall, or Krugman, or Harrison 
(1992), or Piori and Sabel (1994), includes a collection of firms 
who compete with each other for customers, but who also cooperate 
in certain ways, for example in establishing standards, and in 
collectively supporting institutions that train specialized labor. 
The district also contains firms that provide specialized or custom 
inputs and machinery, and those providing various brokerage 
functions. 
Annalee Saxenian's study (1994) of electronic firms, 
particularly those producing computers, in Silicon Valley locates 
the source of their competiti~~e advantage in the network contained 
in Silicon Valley. In her story, it is the people in the valley, 
and their connections, that provide the strength. Firms at any 
time are simply collections of these people who happen to be 
working on a particular project under a particular management. She 
offers little discussion of the question of whether Silicon Valley 
needs to be understood as a particularly American phenomenon. In 
any case, her stress is on Silicon Valley, rather than particular 
firms, or the United States as a nation-state, as the source of 
competitive advantage for the firms that reside there at any time. 
In such analyses, sometimes the focus is on the geographical 
region, with an emphasis on proximity, and sometimes on the 
network, with an emphasis on connections. Saxanian's focus clearly 
is on the region. On the other hand, in the case of the German 
chemical companies that grew up in the late 19th century, various 
authors have emphasized their links with chemists in German 
universities. In some cases, these links were those of a professor 
with his ex students. Similarly, in various accounts of the rise 
of the U.S. biotech firms, ties between university and company 
researchers are stressed. Geographical proximity facilitates these 
connections, but it is the network that is the center of analytic 
attention. 
It is the connections, not geographical proximity at all, that 
are the focus of attention in various studies of the sources of 
strength in the alliances between new biotechnology firms, and 
established pharmaceutical companies, that have been involved in R 
and D and commercialization of several new pharmaceuticals. (See 
e.g. Powell et all forthcoming. ) The network of firm connections 
that extend from Stanford, and MIT, include not only those with 
firms in Silicon valley, and on route 128, but also those with 
firms in Europe and Japan. 
In some cases particular government agencies and programs help 
to define and structure such an extended industry nexus. Thus in 
the early days of the computer industry, and on several occasions 
in the history of the U.S. semiconductor industry, the U.S. D.0.D. 
has provided support, and mechanisms for interaction and 
coordinated action (see e.g. Kelley, 1995). The National 
Institutes of Health serves not only to support research relevant 
to pharmaceuticals and medical devices, but also as a clearing 
house for various kinds of information. Over the years, MITI has 
acted to coordinate Japanese firms in electronics. 
While stressing somewhat different things, in my view analysts 
who are highlighting the importance of industrial districts, or 
complex and possibly geographically disbursed networks, or the role 
of private or public organizations in helping to coordinate a 
collection of firms in an industry, are calling attention to 
basically the same phenomena, which I choose to call here sectoral 
support systems. The analytic focus is on the institutional 
structures that tend to evolve to support an industry, which I 
briefly discussed towards the close of Section 11. 
These structures clearly are more than the sum of the firms 
contained within them, although in some cases key firms or groups 
of firms can have a profound shaping influence. Thus the major 
U.S. companies in computers and microelectronics played and play a 
large role in the formation and operation of Sematech and the 
Semiconductor Industry Asscciation, but these industry wide 
structures are entities of their own. While almost always 
contained nationally, and shaped by broad national institutions, 
these structures are not uniquely molded by them, and to a 
considerable extent develop on their own track. Thus while the 
strong research and training support given to the U.S. 
semiconductor, computer, and software industries by Stanford, MIT, 
Carnegie Mellon, and several other American universities certainly 
has been dependent upon the broad research strength the U.S. 
university system achieved after World War 11, U.S. university 
research strength in comFuter and materials sciences, and 
electrical engineering, has been exceptional. So too university 
research in the biomedical sciences which have supported technical 
advance in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, and in medical 
devices. 
Along the same lines, the venture capital institutions that 
grew up to finance new firms in electronics, and biotechnology, on 
the one hand can be reorganized as part of the general flexible and 
variegated U.S. financial system. On the other hand, many of the 
venture capital firms that grew up to provide support in these two 
areas are quite specialized. 
IV Why Did these Industri~s Develop Differently in Different 
Countries? 
I noted at the start th3t the comparative industry evolution 
project still is in its earl;/ stages. However, from what we have 
done so far, and from a large number of earlier studies describing 
these industries, it is apparent that each of them developed along 
somewhat, sometimes significantly, different paths in different 
countries. 
Of course there were and are some very strong intra industry 
commonalities. Companies producing dyestuffs, synthetic fibers, 
and plastics, tend to be large, with their own inhouse R & D 
laboratories, whether they are German, British, American, or 
Japanese. A semiconductor mass production plant looks pretty much 
the same, wherever it is. But in the chemical products industry, 
German companies set up their own R & D laboratories significantly 
before the British or the American and, for many years, were 
significantly stronger at product innovation. On the other hand, 
American chemical products companies shifted to oil from coal as 
the basic feedstock significantly before the Germans. American 
companies selling semiconductors tend to specialize on 
semiconductors. Semiconductor producers in Japan and Europe tend 
to be part of integrated electrical equipment manufacturing 
companies. 
Let me throw caution to the winds, and give my personal 
impressions about what is en~erging from the study. First, the 
national differences one observes in industry development tend to 
be smallest regarding the broad technologies employed by firms in 
the industry, greater regarding the firm and industry structure 
that evolved, and often greater still in the character and 
effectiveness of supporting institutions. This is not to propose 
that there were not sometines considerable differences across 
nations in the technologies national firms commanded. For many 
years German chemical firms clearly could produce chemical products 
that other firms could not. American semiconductor firms held 
significant technological leads over European and Japanese firms in 
the design and production of integrated circuits up until 1980 or 
so, and continue to have a significant edge in microprocessors. 
Japanese companies designing numerical controlled machine tools for 
general use clearly were way ahead of American firms in terms of 
how they understood user needs. However, for the most part these 
advantages seem to reside in the skills and organization of firms, 
and in their supporting institutional structures, rather than in 
better command of scientific and technological understanding per 
se. 
Second, as discussed earlier, differences in national factor 
endowments and factor prices ssldommade a big difference, although 
differences in skill availabilities did on a number of occasions. 
The major national level variables that made a difference were 
institutional. But third, in those cases where the national 
institutional environment, or legal structures, or specific 
policies, seem to have made a big difference, one also sees firms 
effectively taking advantage of the potential. As noted earlier, 
it probably is a mistake to ask whether it is national factors or 
strong firms that created conparative advantage in a field. Both 
were important and interactsd strongly. The case of the German 
advantages in dyestuffs at the turn of the century, and that of the 
American advantage in computers in the 1960s and 1970s are splendid 
exemplars, as we shall elaborate shortly. 
Fourth, it seems important to distinguish at least three 
stages in an industry's life history: the time when the technology 
has reached a stage where a sizeable market can be tapped, the 
period when technology and industry structure have settled down 
somewhat, and times when new technologies or other changes 
challenge the prevailing industry. 
Differences across countries in inventive and entrepreneurial 
activity in the period before a significant market begins to be 
tapped sometimes makes a difference in the ability of the country's 
firms to compete in that emerging market, but sometimes not. The 
very early days of the automobile industry saw much more inventing 
going on in France than in the U.S., but U.S. firms seized the 
market with Mr. Ford's model T. The early breakthroughs on 
synthetic dyes occurred in the U.K., but German firms seized the 
market after firms began to learn how to do research and 
development effectively in the new field. American firms did the 
pioneering work in numerical control, but Japanese firms too the 
mass market. On the other hand, American firms both pioneered in 
transistor development, and quickly became dominant when transistor 
technology had advanced to a stage where there was a significant 
market. What seems to matter is the prowess and orientation of 
firms when satisfactory desizns and production processes begin to 
emerge, and prior experience in the experimental stage of industry 
development may or may not b? a help. 
As indicated above, our cases suggest that, in turn, the 
prowess and orientation of firms depends both on what the firms 
have done themselves, and the institutional support structure 
stimulating and molding their actions. The German university 
system provided a strongly ad-rantageous environment for the German 
firms venturing into dyestuffs, but it was the German firms 
themselves that, in effect, invented the industrial R & D 
laboratory. The R and D support of the ~merican military clearly 
is a key reason why American companies like IBM, and American 
universities like MIT, got experience in computer design and 
production before companies in other countries. But IBM was, after 
initially devaluing the idea, farsighted in seeing civilian markets 
and in putting its money behind these ideas. 
All of these examples suggest strongly that how an industry 
starts out when large markets began to be tapped can have long run 
consequences. The path dependencies, and particularly the dynamic 
increasing returns, built into various of the industry evolution 
theories, seem to show up strongly in our industry histories. Thus 
the early advantages of the German dye stuff companies, of IBM in 
computers, and the American semiconductor companies who got their 
start selling to the military and later to the computer industry, 
provided the basis for world market dominance that lasted a long 
time. 
Yet from another point of view, the durability of competitive 
advantage seized early in an industry's growth stage is somewhat 
surprising. The theories 2f technology and industry evolution 
discussed earlier suggest that firm and industry structure tends to 
change considerably between the time technology has just reached a 
stage where a sizeable market can be reached, and later in the 
industry's history when product and process technology have become 
more mature. One might e>rpect, therefore, that the bases of 
competitive advantage would change as well. For example, a 
financial system that well serves the needs of new or small firms 
might not be good at servicing the financial needs of larger firms. 
Indeed Ergas(1987), and Florida and Kenney (1990), have made just 
such an argument, proposing in particular that the economic 
institutions of the United States are strong at spawning new 
industries, but weak in sustaining them when they become more 
mature. The ttproduct cycle" theory of comparat ive advantage in 
international trade makes a related argument, that comparative 
advantage shifts from countries amply supplied with scientists and 
engineers to lower wage countries as a technology matures. 
However, most of the industries in our study do not fit this 
pattern. Countries with firms who were strong when an industry 
started rapid development continued to be the home of strong firms 
as the technology matured somewhat and industry structure 
stabilized. 
An interesting exception is the case of numerically controlled 
machine tools. Here, as noted earlier, U. S. f irms pioneered in the 
industry, specializing in precision machining. However, Japanese 
firms seized the much larger market for flexible manufacturers. 
Other exceptions are the loss by American firms of the 
integrated circuit RAM marke~ first to Japan, and now to companies 
in the Asian nics, and the taking over of organic chemical products 
by, on the one hand, petroleum firms, and on the other hand by 
firms in the nics. In my view what is happening here is pretty 
well explained by the "product cycle" theory I mentioned above. As 
the technologies in these areas developed a quite predictable 
track, the advantages of very sophisticated R & D faded, and 
comparative advantage shifted to other countries where the other 
factors of production were aliailable and cheaper. 
Most of the instances revealed by our study of significant 
shifts in the locus of comparative advantage came about because a 
radically new technology came in and obsoleted the competence of 
companies who previously had been dominant. That is, the story of 
changing competitive advantage is a Tushman and Anderson(l986), 
Henderson and Clark(1990), Christensen and Rosenbloom (1993, 1994) 
story, played out across national boundaries, and in some cases 
with some interesting particularities. From another point of view, 
while there is clear evidence of dynamic increasing returns for 
both a broad technology and the firms employing it, in many of our 
industries the turn of events broke any presumed "lockin". 
Thus the development of process technology using petroleum as 
the feedstock for organic chemical products was an American 
endeavor, involving a number of firms and universities, that 
greatly advantaged American companies. The availability of low 
cost petroleum was made a real "lockin" breaking opportunity 
through investments in R and D and new equipment. German .companies 
who had dominated the industry in an earlier era had troubles 
shifting over. 
The computer case is especially interesting. Here the 
appearance of integrated circuits in the 1970s and microprocessors 
in the 1980s in effect enabled companies designing and producing 
computers to purchase a lot of what earlier had to be designed and 
put together internally. These were competence destroying 
innovations, par excellence. And on each occasion there was a wave 
of new entry into the industry, and it was new firms, not the 
established ones, that seizeci the new market opportunities. IBM, 
the dominant firm prior to these revolutions, let the new markets 
be seized by upstarts and, recently, has seen other firms using new 
technologies significantly undercut its principal main frame 
market. But the new firms, successfully seizing the new 
opportunities were, in both cases, largely American. 
This latter case is illustrative of the fact that the U.S. 
economic environment, at least in the era since World War 11, seems 
to have supported the entry of new firms, both when a new industry 
is emerging, and when the technology underlying an industry has 
changed significantly, to a much greater extent than is the case in 
Europe and Japan. In several of the industries in our study, this 
capability to spawn new firms has been the basis of the 
establishment, or in the case of computers the maintenance, of U.S. 
comparative advantage. 
The study I am describing is far from complete. Even if it 
were further along, space constraints would force my description to 
be highly selective, and there still would be major questions about 
just how to interpret some of the findings. However, I believe the 
conception of the study is sufficiently interesting, and some of 
the findings that already have been written up in draft chapters 
sufficiently provocative, to warrant this preliminary report. 
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